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IS REGULATION NECESSARY? CALIFORNIA AIR
TRANSPORTATION AND NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICY
AIR transportation in the United States, as elsewhere in the world, is a
regulated and protected industry.' The present system of economic regulation
was established in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 19382 and has survived vir-
tually unchanged despite vast changes in the character of the industry O and a
review and reorganization of government control which resulted in the
present statute, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.4 Government restriction
of entry into the industry and regulation of fares has fostered unnecessarily
'high fares, encouraged uneconomic practices, and limited the variety of service
available to the public. The performance of the largest air transportation mar-
ket in the world provides convincing evidence that fares are much lower and
service more responsive to public needs where restrictions on entry are absent
1. In many countries control is exercised directly by establishing a government-
owned and operated carrier which monopolizes or overwhelmingly dominates the trans-
portation system. In some countries, the monopoly carrier is privately owned, but govern-
ment-regulated. In a few countries, which include five of the world's largest air trans.
portation systems (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and the United States), the govern-
ment licenses companies to operate scheduled services in competition with the state airlines
or, as in the United States, in competition with one another.
2. 52 Stat 977 (1938).
3. In 1938, the industry was still in its childhood. The first aircraft that offered even
the promise of an unsubsidized profit (the Douglas DC-3) was still being introduced
into service. Flying was a novelty reserved for the adventurous or for those whose business
required maximum speed. In 1938, all the domestic trunklines (airlines performing
mainline scheduled services entirely within the continental United States, excluding
Alaska) carried 1,536,000 passengers. STAFF OF Suncomi. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON TIIP
JUDiciARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SEss., AIRLINES (Comm. Print 1957), [hereinafter cited as
AIRLINES] Table 2, 18. In 1964, the domestic trunklines carried 72,988,000 passengers,
CAB Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, Dec. 1964 at 1 (line 19). The number of passenger-
miles (one passenger carried one mile, the standard measure of output in air transportation)
flown increased from 479,844,000 in 1938 to 44,141,261,000 in 1964. Thus, in terms of output,
the industry is approximately one hundred times the size of its 1938 counterpart. The
smallest domestic trunk line (Northeast) produced more in 1964 than did the entire
domestic industry in 1938. CAB Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, Dec. 1964, at 15 (line 11).
Compare with AIRLINES, Table 2, 18.
Aircraft today are six times as large, more than three times as fast, and can fly more
than five times as far as their 1938 counterparts. They also produce seat-miles at a cost
less than a third of their earlier counterparts (although their initial cost is six to fifteen
times as high) and aircraft still more economical to operate are on order or projected,
Today, the cost per seat-mile of operating a modern jet aircraft over long distances is
about one cent. For shorter distances, it is greater, although still less than two cents.
Aviation Week and Space Technology, "Operating Costs of Turbine Aircraft in Airline
Service," May 31, 1965 at 36-37.
4. 72 Stat 731,49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958).
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and control over fares is rarely exercised. It is time for the CAB to reconsider
national regulatory policy, benefiting from tAventy-seven years of accumulated
experience and the remarkable example of the Los Angeles-San Francisco
market
I. THE HISTORY OF AIRLINE REGULATION
The present regulatory scheme had its beginnings in earlier government
efforts, which were inspired by the desire of Congress and the Post Office to
develop an airmail system.5 Government and commercial mistakes and the
Great Depression combined to render these initial attempts inadequate.0
In the Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925,7 Congress, attempting to create an ar-
rangement analogous to that by which private railroad companies carried the
bulk of overland mail, transferred primary responsibility for the carriage of
airmail from the Army to private firms organized especially for this purpose.
But air carriers could not yet survive on the passengers and freight they could
attract and government mail contracts became the life-blood of air commerce
in the United States. The 1925 Act provided for competitive bidding for short-
term contracts, with the amount to be paid the airlines limited to 80 per cent
of the airmail postage revenues. Because available aircraft were not economical
enough to operate on the revenues available at airmail rates, the original act
failed to attract bids. Therefore the Act was amended to allow four-year con-
tracts at a level of payments considerably above the earlier Act, with payments
no longer linked to airmail revenues. Between 1925 and 1934, the government
provided money on ever more liberal terms while exercising ever greater con-
trol over routes and business practices. Since operating a route without an
airmail contract was nearly impossible, the Post Office could control overall
pattern of service and route structures by awarding or withholding contracts.
This system was informal and haphazard,8 and by 1930, the route system
was so chaotic that the Postmaster General called a later-infamous conference
for the purpose of creating at least two transcontinental routes to compete with
United Aircraft and Transport Co. (the predecessor of United Airlines), the
only coast-to-coast carrier. The attending carriers were instructed to arrange
5. World War I had given the world an inkling of the possibilities afforded by the
airplane. In this country, the Post Office particularly was interested in air transport as
a means of moving the mail more quickly. Experimental services were started by the
Army and suggested that a permanent system was feasible.
6. For a more complete history of the early development of the industry and regula-
tory scheme than that presented here, see RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERoNAUTics Act Anm-o-
TATED (1939); KEYEs, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO Am TRAN PORATio: (1951);
H. L. SmrH, AIRvAYS: THE HISTORY OF COMME.RCIAL AvIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1942). For a colorful, but less-than-scholarly account, see K.ELLY, THE SKYS'S THE Lnm.
(1963). See also AInuzNES ch. 1.
7. 43 Stat 805 (1925).
8. No attempt was made to create a coherent transportation system. Awards were
made by competitive bids. Since entry costs were low and efficiency was almost completely
unrelated to size in the primitive technology of the period, a patchwork of small, disjointed
lines was created.
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routes among themselves for submission to the Post Office Department. In the
ensuing route rearrangement, the smaller operators were subjected to tremen-
dous pressure to merge into the larger systems, both by the larger carriers
themselves and by the Postmaster General. In the end, two new systems, TWA
and American, 9 were created by the merger of small lines. They were awarded
contracts by a government-approved system of rigged bidding. Prospective bid-
ders other than those ultimately to get the contract were bought out at the
public's expense, since the cost of buying out competitors was reflected in the
contract price. This cartelized and expensive system was exposed by then
Senator Hugo Black in a sensational investigation conducted in 1934. The
investigation disclosed that the three cartels held contracts for ninety per cent
of all air mail payments. In addition, the parent companies of these airlines
were vertically integrated, and included manufacturers such as Boeing, North
American, Pratt & Whitney, and Curtis-Wright. As a result of this investiga-
tion, all contracts were cancelled, and the Army made a literally disastrous
attempt to fly the mail.10 The airlines limped along on passenger and express
revenues which were by that time sufficient to avert immediate bankruptcy.
The comprehensive Airmail Act of 1934 11 attempted to remedy the defects
of the earlier arrangements. It attempted to ensure competition, to make ver-
tical integration arrangements illegal, and to bring rates and contracts under
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, although the route
awards were still to be made by the Postmaster General. The Act called for
the establishment of four transcontinental routes and routes on each coast.
Subsidy was to be granted through a "mail pay" formula which was related
to the capacity and type of equipment offered, rather than the amount of mail
actually carried. Since the only organizations competent to handle the impor-
tant routes were the discredited airlines, a face-saving formula was devised
which enabled them to bid for the contracts. 12 These firms and the predecessor
of Eastern Airlines received the major awards, and the "big four" pattern of
trunk carrier service 13 was established.
9. Transcontinental and Western Air and American Airways, Inc., the predecessors
of Trans World Airlines, Inc. and American Airlines, Inc. respectively.
10. The contracts were cancelled as of February 19, 1934 and the cancellation remained
in effect until May 16, 1934. During that period, the Army, flying unsuitable equipment
under poor weather conditions with little backlog of experience in foul weather and night
operations, experienced a series of accidents. Twelve pilots were killed, and at least twice
that many were injured. Public outcry at this pointless slaughter led to the enactment of
the 1934 Act and the reinstatement of the contracts. H. L. Smith, op. cit. supra note 6 at
249-58.
11. 48 Stat. 933 (1934).
12. AIRLINES 13.
13. The "big four" are American Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Trans World Airlines
and United Air Lines, the four largest domestic trunk (main-line) carriers. Their share
of total traffic has been reduced somewhat since 1938 as a result of continuing efforts by
the Board to strengthen smaller carriers. See AIRLINES 19-21.
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This history greatly influenced the regulatory pattern created in the 1938
Act, and has had-a psychological impact upon both the carriers and their regu-
lators. The new air transportation system was dominated 14 by four carriers
identified in the public mind with the "spoils meetings" of 1930, and hence
with collusion and division of markets. Fear of "big four" domination and ul-
timate air transport monopoly was one of the most important sources of public
pressure for the passage of the 1938 Act, and has continued to concern the
Board and the public.' 5
During the period when the attention of the public was focused upon the
monopoly problems of the industry, the industry itself was becoming increas-
ingly concerned about excessive competition. None of the legislation prior to
1938 contained any restrictions on entry. It might have been expected that in
this period when mail carriage was the crucial source of revenue for air car-
riers, the exclusive nature of mail contracts would have acted as a barrier to
entry. But entry was relatively inexpensive and, even during the depression,
some individuals were willing to take a chance in aviation without a mail
contract.' 6 Carriers with airmail contracts were not permitted to compete in
any market for which a mail contract had been awarded to another carrier.
Since mail contracts covered virtually all potentially profitable routes, the re-
sult was a government-sponsored division of markets, in which the contract
carriers gave up the right to compete in other markets for monopoly rights in
their own. Non-contract carriers were subject to no such restrictions and estab-
lished themselves on the most profitable routes. This competition cut into the
non-mail revenues of the contract carriers at the same time as the Depression
was affecting them adversely. The result was to threaten capital investments
made by the established carriers during the boom years of the late 1920's and
during the early 1930's while they were under the protection of a cartelized
industrial structure. In addition, developing aircraft technology promised future
profits, and passenger business was steadily, if slowly, growing. Thus, the in-
dustry was likely to attract still more new capital in the future. In the face of
this competitive threat to past investment and future security, the airlines
formed a trade association (the Air Transport Association) and pressed for
protective legislation.
14. In 1938, the year the present regulatory scheme was enacted, the big four shared
81.9% of the industry's total output. Ainarus, Table 3, 20.
15. Including a massive congressional investigation; see STAFF OF SucoMts. No. 5,
HousE COsmMTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS., MONOPOLY PFsoBLos N
REGULATED INDUsTRIEs - AimLiEs four volumes (Comm. Print 1956). Both the Board
and the industry regard air transport as a public utility industry i.th monopolistic and
destructive tendencies. There is near-universal, agreement on the advantages of large size,
"advantages" apparently quite unrelated to the minimum efficient operational size.
16. Aircraft cost little, ground facilities were minimal even on the established lines,
the governmet-provided airways wVere available for all to use without charge, and the
glamour of air transportation attracted speculative capital.
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The new association put before Congress dire predictions of commercial
chaos and impaired safety. 17 It demanded protective legislation.18 The result-
ing Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 19 provided the industry with protection so
efficacious that not one carrier has been certificated to perform domestic trunk
service which was not operating on May 14, 1938 and thus qualified for a
certificate under the automatic-certification (grandfather) clause.
20
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, successor to the 1938 Act, gives to the
Federal Aviation Agency jurisdiction over the "technical" or "operational"
aspects of air transportation (safety regulation, airport development, and con-
trol of the airspace) .21 These activities are largely outside the scope of this
Comment. The "economic" aspects of air transportation (e.g., rates, routes,
and market structure) are within the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, which was established by the 1938 Act 2 2 and which continued virtually
17. In 1937, the president of the Air Transport Association argued the need for
regulation as follows:
Of the 120,000,000 of private investment which has been made in American Air
Transport, more than half is gone. This condition of financial starvation not only
makes it impossible for these lines to take full advantage of possible technological
improvements, but could lead to traffic competition of such intensity that the accl-
dent ratio might accelerate instead of decline. Failure to correct the existing situ-
ation and to do so promptly, means more than loss to the capital remaining invested
in the Air Transport industry, to the labor employed in it, and to this country's
position in civil aviation. It may very well entail a large cost in human life.
KELLY, THE SKY's THE LIMIT 101 (1963).
18. The president of the Association testified before a House committee considerling
regulation:
But the essential point is that it is possible to start a service on but a minor
amount of capital, and this possibility has become an actuality from time to time
in the past. With the increase in traffic, the temptation thus to begin new services
is becoming stronger.
It is needless to point out that this condition means much that is good, but also
carries with it the threat of much that is bad. It promises haphazard growth, if we
are not careful. It threatens unbridled and disastrous competition if we do not
take heed. It leaves the small lines in a very precarious position. It requires some
orderly procedure, preferably, I personally believe, the procedure of certificates of
convenience and necessity already embodied in our Federal legislation as to railroads
and interstate motor carriers, which will provide for minimum standards of service
to be complied with before business is begun, and will give some protection to ex-
isting lines so that momentary, unsound overcompetition will not threaten,
Hearings on H.R. 5234, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1937).
19. 52 Stat. 977 (1938).
20. Section 401 (e) (1), 52 Stat. 988. Remarkable as this fact may seem on its face,
it is almost unbelievable when considered in the light of the hundred-fold growth
of the industry and the route changes made necessary by changing technology and market
development.
21. 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1421 (1958).
22. It was described in § 201 of the original Acts as the "Authority" (52 Stat at 980)
but it was redesignated by the Reorganization Plan IV of 1940 as the "Board" in order to
delineate clearly its function of economic regulation and distinguish it from that part of
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unchanged, but as a separate agency, under the 1958 Act.m The Board is em-
powered under Subchapter IV of the 1958 Act to exercise supervision and
control over entry into the industry,24 cities to be served,m rates,20 direct sub-
sidies, 27 and terms of mail carriage.m The Board also has the power to approve
or prevent mergers, acquisitions, and transfers of control of air carriers," and
actions so approved are immune from the operation of the antitrust laws.'"
Congess made clear the government's objectives in regulating air commerce:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this
chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other things, as
being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience
and necessity.
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation sys-
tem properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner as to recog-
nize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree
of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation,
and to improve the relations between and coordinate transportation by,
air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue pref-
erences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develop-
ment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Ser-
vice, and the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce;
(f) The promotion, encouragement and development of civil aeronau-
tics.3
1
The Board is empowered to regulate entry by issuing certificates of public
convenience and necessity.32 No carrier can engage in air transportation with-
out such a certificate. Some carriers were certificated under the "grandfather
clause" of the 1938 Act. For other carriers, the Act provides that:
The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part of
the transportation ordered by the application, if it finds that the applicant
the parent agency (Civil Aeronautics Administration) concerned with operational regu-
lation.
23. 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. 9§ 1301-1542 (1958).
24. 72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. 1371(a)(3)(1958). Although it is industry practice to
refer to sections of the Act dealing with economic regulation by their statute section
numbers, e.g., § 401(a)-(d), the writer will use the code section numbers, and further
cites to the 1958 Act will be made simply by reference to the appropriate section of 49 U.S.C.
25. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e) (1958).
26. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1374 (1958).
27. 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b) (3) (1958).
28. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1375, 1376 (1958).
29. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378, 1379 (1958).
30. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958).
31. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
32. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1958).
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is fit, willing and able to perform the transportation properly, and to con-
form to the provisions of this chapter and the rules, regulations, and re-
quirements of the Board hereunder, and that such transportation is re-
quired by the public convenience and necessity; otherwise such applica-
tion shall be denied.a3
A permanent route certificate is a grant of monopoly or oligopoly power to
exploit the traffic over a named group of cities arranged sequentially. 4 Al-
though the Board may limit the operating rights granted by a certificate,05
with or without limitations, a route award is potentially a valuable property.
The value of a certificate is enhanced because the CAB attempts to protect
the revenue of certificate holders from the effects of competition, 0 and the cer-
tificates are transferable.37 Carriers pay a price, though, since government
supervision is potentially so pervasive as to interfere with virtually all man-
agement prerogatives. However, even observers inclined to defend the interests
of the.airlines have acknowledged the munificence of the 1938 Act.
The resulting Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave the airlines almost all
that they desired. The routes of the then existing ... airlines were pro-
tected, and the threat of outside competition was practically eliminated.
Furthermore a generous subsidy was provided, in effect a blank check.
The carriage of Air Mail need no longer be on a contract basis, subject to
competitive bids. Instead, government mail pay was to be awarded to a
carrier on the basis of "need." Unless a carrier could be shown to be wil-
fully fraudulent or inefficient in his management, he no longer had to fear
losses. The government stood ready not only to make up any deficit, but
also to insure a return on his investment. All in all, the ... Act seemed
to be a bonanza for the airlines, and the major figures in the industry
greeted its passage enthusiastically.38
33. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (1) (1958).
34. The following is a typical route certificate:
Northeast Airlines, Inc. is hereby authorized, subject to the provisions here-
inafter set forth, the provisions of title IV of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
and the orders, rules, and regulations issued thereunder, to engage in air transpor-
tation with respect to persons, property, and mail, as follows:
5. Between the terminal point New York, N.Y.-Newark, N.J., the inlter-
mediate points Hartford, Conn., Springfield, Mass., Keene, N.H., White River
Junction, Montpelier-Barre and Newport, Vt., and the terminal point Burlington,
Vermont.
The service herein authorized is subject to the following terms, conditions, and
limitations:
(4) The holder shall serve Hartford, Conn., and Springfield, Mass., only on
flights originating or. terminating at Keene, N.H., or a point north thereof.
C.A.B. CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESsrry (as amended) for Route 27,
Northeast Airlines, Inc. (Issued pursuant to C.A.B. Order No. E-19910.)
35. It usually does so to limit schedule frequency to avoid "excess competition,"
See, e.g., the limitation imposed by provision (4) of the Northeast Airlines certificate,
supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., 22 C.A.B. 991 (1955).
37. With the approval of the Board. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(h) (1958).
38. KELLY, op cit. mtpra note 6, at 102.
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In 1938, regulation seemed a small price to pay, especially since the industry
appeared likely to face an annual deficit for many years to come. By 1952,
however, the major airlines no longer required direct subsidy,m and since then
they have been less reluctant to complain about government interference. But
the other protection afforded by the 1938 legislation, the freedom from new
competition, has been jealously guarded.40 Indeed, the airlines have demon-
strated an almost pathological fear of open competition, especially price com-
petition.
This fear, dignified by twenty-five years of regulatory enforcement, has been
transmogrified into a sacred truth - namely, that airlines, if allowed to com-
pete without restrictions would engage in a frenzy of below-cost selling to the
ultimate ruin of all. Such "cut-throat" destructive competition involves carriers
in an overcapitalized market (i.e., too many sellers) cutting fares to the point
where the increase in market demand created by lower fares will not compen-
sate for reduced unit revenues (i.e., "dilution of revenues").
II. THE EcoNoMIc THEORY Op AIRLINE REGULATION
The CAB, in regulating the industry, has shared the carriers' fear that price
competition would be destructive. In addition, the Board concurs in the general
belief that, unregulated, the industry would become monopolistic.A1 The mo-
nopoly spectre has haunted the Board in two inconsistent and equally amor-
phous forms.
First, it is feared that without regulation the industry would be "excessively
competitive." The resulting "cut-throat" competition, in addition to causing
economic waste, would lead ultimately to monopoly. It is feared that such de-
structive competition, in which no carrier could operate profitably, would drive
all but the strongest out of business. The survivor could then exercise market
power and provide inferior service at monopoly fares. This fear probably had
39. See, e.g., 14 CA.B. 558, 569 (1951); 14 C.A.B. 1074, 1078 (1951); 15 C.A.B.
238, 239 (1952).
40. Examples of this are the trunk-lines' twelve-year fight against the "irregular car-
riers" (now known as "supplemental air carriers"), who attempted to develop low-fare
markets ignored by the certificated carriers, and their almost universal resistance to un-
traditional innovation (e.g., anything that resembles price competition) even from within
their own ranks. See KELLY, op. cit. supra note 6, ch. 25.
41. See note 15 supra. David Bluestone, a noted air transport economist, in his article
The Problem of Competition Avmong Domestic Trunk Carriers, Part I, 20 J. Am L & CoM.
379, provides an outstanding example of this type of reasoning (at, inter alia, 380-81,
384-91, 395). Mr. Bluestone is now head of the Planning Office of the CAB but he
was not employed by the Board at the time the article was published, and hence the article
cannot necessarily be taken to represent the Board's official position.
For other studies of air transport market behavior, see GiLL & BATES, AxLnuHE Co!,n-
TrrIoN: A STUDY OF THE EFFEcTs OF COMPETITION ON THE QUALITY AND PRICE oF Am-
LINE SERVICE AND THE SELF-SuFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES Do.isrzc AUm.Is
(1949) ; CHERInGToN, Aunm PRICE POLICY: A STUDY OF Dossrxc AmLI PAsSENGEL
F.Rs (1958); and S. RcHmOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN Am TPANSPOATion
(1961).
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its origins in the carriers' Depression experience, where competition from un-
regulated lines combined with generally poor business conditions to affect ad-
versely their investment.
Second, the CAB fears that without regulation the industry would not be
competitive enough. The Board believes that monopoly would result through
internal growth, merger, or collusion. This fear may have its origins in mem-
ories of the "spoils conference" and the collusion revealed by the 1934 investi-
gation, and it is probably reinforced by recent attempted mergers.
Assuming that air transport firms behave rationally (that is, that they act
to maximize gains and minimize losses), fears either of destructive competi-
tion or of monopoly must be justifiable by economic analysis to be credible.
It may be that airlines are economically similar to public utilities. Or, it may be
that the industry is characterized by barriers to new entry sufficiently high to
allow monopolistic practices to survive unchecked by competitive forces, If
neither of these is the case, it is difficult to see how the Board's economic fears
are justified. Since the natural play of market forces in a public utility indus-
try works to the public detriment, government regulation of public utilities in
effect removes them from the competitive sector of the economy. In an indus-
try characterized by the erection of high barriers to entry, market forces which
would otherwise operate to the public benefit are stifled. The anti-trust laws
seek to preserve the free operation of the market by preventing the erection
of such barriers.
Public utilities such as telephone and power companies are described as
"natural monopolies." In these industries the largest firm always has the lowest
unit costs; therefore, only one firm can survive. Since the required capital in-
vestment is high and cannot be easily transferred or liquidated, new entry is
costly and unlikely to occur. The established firm can use its natural cost ad-
vantages to drive out the new entrant, and since the new entrant's capital in-
vestment is immobile, it will suffer substantial losses. Such industries are regu-
lated to prevent the output restrictions and monopoly prices which the free
play of market forces would permit. There is general agreement upon the
economic necessity of regulating natural monopoly industries. But Caves has
demonstrated that air transportation is not a natural monopoly industry. He
finds that, once minimum efficient size has been attained, scale of operations
plays an insignificant role in determining costs and very large size may even
be slightly disadvantageous 2
Public utilities such as pipelines and railroads are regulated for a different
reason. These industries are characterized by high unavoidable (fixed) costs
and low avoidable (variable) costs. Consequently, the average cost of each
unit of output carries a high capital burden and is far greater than the mar-
ginal cost of production. The invested capital is immobile and cannot readily
be liquidated or moved to a more profitable location. To recover and profit
42. CAVES, AiR TRANSPORT AND rrs REGULATORS 56-60 (1962), esp. Table 18, at 58
and Fig. 1, at 59.
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from this capital investment, such a firm must sell at average cost or above.
But, faced with competition, a utility of this kind will price below average cost.
The heavy burden of unavoidable costs (a product of inability to liquidate, cur-
tail output, or move) creates pressure to reduce prices in order to use existing
capacity. Any price above marginal cost will contribute something toward
meeting fixed costs and the firm will resort to such pricing as a short-run
measure. Since each reduction in price will produce a corresponding price
reduction by his competitor, the market price will move inexorably toward
marginal cost. At marginal cost, however, none of the firm's capital is re-
covered.
Regulation of such industries proceeds upon the premise that pricing prac-
tises of this kind injure the public. The theory is that industries pricing far be-
low average cost will be unattractive to capital. This is said to be undesirable
because "needed" services will not be provided, and technological improvement
will be slowed or halted. It is further claimed that the excess capacity result-
ing from competitive duplication represents economic waste since immobility
prevents reemployment of redundant capital. The theory holds that the strong-
est firm will acquire a monopoly position as the capital reserves of its com-
petitors are depleted. Typically, such "utilities" are removed from the competi-
tive sector by government licensing (to eliminate or restrict competition) and
rate regulation (to prevent destructive or monopoly pricing).
This theory is widely, but not universally, accepted. Regardless of its eco-
nomic validity, the theory provides no justification for regulating the air trans-
port industry, for it is generally acknowledged that the air transport industry
is characterized by high variable (and thus avoidable) costs, rather than high
fixed costs.48 Since aircraft can be operated over any route offering the possi-
bility of a profit, and since there is a thriving used aircraft market,4" capital
not profitably employed can be easily reemployed or liquidated.
4
5
If it is true that the air transport industry is characterized neither by con-
tinually declining costs over feasible ranges of output, nor by a high ratio of
fixed to variable costs and immobility of capital, then regulating airlines as
public utilities is unjustifiable and works to the detriment of the public.40 For
43. Id. at 79-82. Even Bluestone, although attempting to prove that airlines are ap-
propriately regulated as public utilities, recognizes this cost relationship. His attempt
to avoid its implications, by noting that most costs of the type which are fixed in "other"
public utility industries are variable in air transportation, is unsuccessful. It is pre-
cisely this relationship of costs to output that makes airline costs available, and thus frees
industry from the capital pressures which are said to create destructive pricing. Bluestone,
The Problem of Competition Among Domestic Trunk Carriers, Part II, 21 J. Ain L. &
Com 50, 57-68.
44. CAVEs, op. cit. supra note 42, at 106.
45. Id. at 80.
46. The most important work advocating free entry into air transport markets is
KEYEs, FE ERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION (1951). The basic theses
of this work are reflected in a series of articles by Mrs. Keyes in 16 J. AIR L. & Co,.r. 280
(1949), 18 J. AiR L. & Com. 46 (1951), and 22 J. AiR L. & Com. 192 (1955). Mrs. Keyes
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in situations other than those described, the market operates to lower prices,
increase output and tailor production to suit consumer preferences.
If airlines have high avoidable and low unavoidable costs, they will not com-
pete at prices which fail to provide adequate return, since curtailing operations
will significantly reduce costs. If airline capital is mobile, then it will not re-
main employed in markets where the marginal rate of return is insufficient to
justify its commitment. There will be no economic waste. If the airline indus-
try is not a natural monopoly industry, then size alone will not confer market
power and a small but efficient line will be able to survive competition even
with a giant.
The airlines, long accustomed to uniform rates high enough to support all
but the most inefficient, have come to regard price competition as almost
always "cut-throat." This view depends upon the implicit assumption that all
airlines operate at approximately the same level of efficiency, and that such
competition merely "dilutes" revenues to the disadvantage of all. But if air-
lines vary markedly in efficiency, technological or marketing efficiencies can
confer cost advantages on the efficient carrier. Competitive pricing will then
shift market shares in favor of the more efficient carrier and, in addition, ex-
pand the market without "diluting" revenues. Such price competition will not
be destructive because the higher cost carrier will not be forced by high, un-
recoverable fixed costs to maintain capacity. If this analysis is borne out in
practice, unregulated- airlines behave like competitive manufacturing and mar-
keting firms 47 and should not be regulated as public utilities.
However, if the hoped-for competitive benefits to the public would not ma-
terialize dueto market imperfections, little will be gained by removing airline
regulation, unless the market imperfections are corrected. Freedom of entry Is
vital to the operation of a competitive market with few sellers because it pro-
vides the control that keeps output high and price low. On one hand, if the
price rises and makes possible a. higher-than-competitive return, more capital
will flow into the market and new firms will enter, thus bringing prices down
to the competitive level. Also, freedom of entry prevents any firm from using
makes a strong case, but she does not seem to recognize the political power of the internal
subsidy issue, and how essential it is for a free market advocate to deal with it. CAVES, op.
cit. supra note 42 discusses the effects of entry in Parts I and IV of his book and concludes
that these effects would be beneficial, but he limits his scope to already certificated carriers
and fails to put the discussion into argument form and follow it through to its logical
- conclusion. Part IV of Caves' book deals with alternate modes of regulation and freer
entry, but never seriously considers truly free entry into trunk markets, apparently be-
,cause he is haunted by the.ghost of the cutthroat competition argument that lie himself
has killed. Id. at 433.
47. In view of the investment/revenue ratio given by Bluestone, supra note 41, at 57
n. 74, this fact should not be surprising. Bluestone points out that airlines have a ratio
of investment to gross revenues (0.6:1) which is between that of manufacturing (1:1) and
trading firms .(1:4-5), and very much unlike public utilities (5-6:1). Since airlines are
integrated firms, carrying on 15oth production and marketing activities this result seems
logical. See also CAvEs, op. cit. supra note 42, at 81.
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destructive pricing as a means to gain a monopoly. If competitors realize that
selling below cost can never be the prelude to establishing a monopoly (due to
the ever-present possibility of new entrants selling at a competitive price),
then they will regard "cut-throat" competition as suicidal. Prices will be
lowered when true efficiencies give market advantages. Since it has been
demonstrated that barriers to entry other than those artificially imposed by
regulation are relatively insubstantial in the air transport industry,4 from an
economic standpoint, an unregulated market should operate to the benefit of
the consuming public.
But regulation of air transportation is claimed to achieve political and social
as well as economic objectives. It is claimed that regulation provides air trans-
port to areas which would otherwise not be served and that regulation guar-
antees safety. The first may be an appropriate national policy. And no one
would question the importance of the second. But neither justifies the present
system of regulation.
According to one estimate, fully half of United States airline cities do not
generate enough traffic to cover the additional cost of providing them with
service.49 Some of these cities are subsidized directly, through government pay-
ments made to the local service carriers, but service to many is supported
privately through internal subsidy. The CAB requires all carriers to serve cities
and route segments that do not cover costs and to pay for such service out of
profits extracted from long-haul or high-density segments served at higher-
than-competitive fares. For example, United serves cities such as Elko, Nevada
in return for being permitted to operate its transcontinental routes. The Board
encourages even local service carriers, all of whom are subsidized directly by
the government, to reduce the amount of direct subsidy by serving profitable
high-density markets and using the profits to pay for service to unproductive
points.
Normally, in a market economy, services which cannot be sold at a profit
are not sold at all. To provide a service which does not generate enough de-
mand to cover costs is wasteful. Resources consumed in producing this service
could have been used to provide other, more desired, services elsewhere in the
economy. Of course, social benefits may outweigh economic costs. But pro-
ponents of subsidy frequently purport to justify subsidized service on economic
grounds, arguing that national or regional economic benefits flow from provid-
ing such transportation at low cost tW Benefits are said to accrue to persons
other than those purchasing the service, and hence market performance is
claimed to be an inadequate measure of value. This argument cannot be tested
in the abstract, but only through analysis of each claim for subsidy. Subsidy is
economically justifiable so long as it does not exceed the total value of the
48. CAvEs, op. cit. supra note 42, at 92,95.
49. Id. at 414.
50. LOCAL SERviCE ME=ERS OF THE ASSOCIATiON OF LOCAL SEvicE Ta-uisPo-r Ant-
.mxs (ALTA), AN EvALuATIoN OF THE CAB REPORT TO THE PRlEswNT ou Amuzm
Sussnw REDucTiON 13-15 (1963) (hereinafter cited as ALTA REPORT).
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economic benefits conferred by the service. When economic benefits are in-
sufficient to offset costs, subsidy may be provided for purely social or political
reasons or withheld, leaving the route to the free market. Withholding subsidy
does not mean that small cities are denied air transportation. Smaller carriers
(air taxis), private aircrafts, and charters are available at higher rates to the
user but lower cost to the economy as a whole.
Non-economic justifications of subsidy are, ex hypothesis, beyond economic
argument. But a subsidy provided on non-economic grounds ought to be de-
signed to do as little economic harm as possible. By this standard public sub-
sidy from general revenues is preferable to private transfer payments. It makes
little economic sense to charge one group of consumers a higher-than-competi-
tive price in order to provide similar but economically unrelated services to
another group of consumers. Artificially high prices for, main-line transporta-
tion decrease demand for such services, injuring those who could have profit-
ably used the service at its true cost. Subsidizing in this way creates an alloca-
tion of resources which does not maximize output of goods and services in the
economy as a whole. An efficient allocation is achieved only by employing
resources where they can be most profitably used.
Defenders of internal subsidy claim that private transfer payments save tax-
payers' money.5 1 Since the deficit incurred by the operation to be subsidized
is independent of the source of the subsidy payments, it cannot be argued that
the total cost of internal subsidy is less than the total cost of public subsidy on
any given route. Moreover, it certainly cannot be argued that dollars for in-
ternal subsidy come into existence gratuitously. The citizen deprived of the
opportunity to profitably use air transportation due to artificially high costs
is "taxed" just as surely as if the Government collected the amount of lost
profits from him. And those who travel on profitable routes, paying higher
than competitive fares are "taxed" privately for the use of the service.
Finally, if output were increased by the more efficient allocations of resources
which would result from the elimination of internal subsidy, the increase in
total economic wealth would result in a decrease in the percentage of total
revenues contributed to subsidy. Naturally, the total tax would be the same,
but the taxpayer would find the bill easier to pay. Because public subsidy makes
tax costs visible, benefits may be weighed against the cost of providing them.
Internal subsidy makes possible disguised inefficiency.
The burden of subsidizing should fall where the benefits, economic or other,
accrue. If the service is regarded as beneficial to the nation or economy ats a
whole, the nation should pay. If a certain geographical or economic sector is
benefited, the burden of the subsidy ought to be placed there. Users of profit-
able routes do not benefit specially from the availability of service to unprofit-
able points. It is neither fair nor efficient to place the burden of subsidy on
them.
51. ALTA REPoRT 38 (1963).
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The final argument advanced is that economic regulation is necessary to in-
sure safety. 2 This argument is based on the prediction that an unregulated
market would be characterized by the proliferation of financially unstable car-
riers, and the assumption that financial stability contributes to safe operation.
The first claim is simply untrue.53 The second, while true, does not justify per-
vasive economic regulation of the CAB variety. Expenditures to preserve high
maintenance standards and permit flight cancellations when safety requires do
impose short-run financial burdens. But financial stability sufficient to ensure
safe operation already is a prerequisite to entry. Additional economic regula-
tion is superfluous. The FAA is empowered to withhold air carrier operating
certificates 54 from carriers lacking the financial stability necessary for safe
operation. No carrier can operate without such a certificate. The FAA is deter-
mined to enforce these requirements strictly, particularly after the Paradise
Airlines accident of March, 1964. 5 The accident was caused by the combina-
tion of the airline's failure to replace a defective instrument and the pilot's
unwise decision to land under instrument conditions and both are thought at-
tributable to financial instability.
Profitable airlines operating in regulated markets have experienced accidents
caused by negligent maintenance.50 No supervisory system is perfect. But the
FAA can ensure that new entrants meet standards at least as stringent as those
applied to presently-certificated carriers. Further, if public sentiment demanded,
the FAA could expand its enforcement of safety standards to include prevent-
ative inspection. The added cost of such inspections could be financed by a tax
on air travel, so that the beneficiaries of the inspection system - the traveling
public - would pay it. This system would provide improved safety at a rela-
52. See note 17, .mpra.
53. See text accompanying notes 114-17, infra.
54. These are issued under Civil Air Regulations, 14 CFR § 42 (1964), and certify
that the holder conforms to the safety requirements established by the FAA. The regula-
tions require extensive disclosure of financial information, including resources, financially
interested parties, and projections of expected income and expenditures. The safety re-
quirements for intrastate operators of airline-size aircraft are the same as the require-
ments under 14 CFR § 42.512 (1964), Part 40, which governs C.A.B.-certificated carriers.
14 CFR § 42.1(4) (1964). As of April 1, 1965, 14 CFR § 40, 41 and 42 were consolidated
and revised as Federal Air Regulation No. 121, 14 CFR - (1965). The changes reflect
efforts to make the standards of minimum financial stability even more rigorous than
before. FAA operating certificates should not be confused with CAB certificates of public
convenience and necessity, the economic permits issued under 4 U.S.C. § 1371, 72 Stat.
754 (1958).
55. CALIFORIA LEGIsLATURE, TRANSCRIPr OF PROCEMINnGS: INTRAsrATE Am CAR-
RiuRs r CAI.IFoRniA AVIAT ON 50 (1964) [hereinafter cited as IN-rRAsTATE Ani CAnriIMS
iN CALIFORNIA].
56. Northwest Airlines, one of the most profitable trunk carriers, experienced a fatal
accident in October, 1961, at Chicago, Ill. as a result of a mechanic's failure to connect
the aileron controls properly, and the negligence of an inspector in approving the faulty
connection. AviationVeek, December 24, 1962, pp. 77-91.
Flight International, Feb. 25, 1965, p. 273.
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tively slight cost and would make possible a public judgment as to whether
the safety benefits were worth the cost. Such a tax would surely burden the
consumer less than the hidden costs imposed by the present system of economic
regulation.
The present structure of air transport economic regulation was created in
response to fears and assumptions founded in the experiences of an infant in-
dustry operating in the Depression. Its perpetuation is in part attributable to
the failure of regulators and observers to distinguish clearly the "system" from
the objectives it was designed to achieve. The objectives of regulation -
economic stability, adequate and economical service to the public, and safety 6
- could today be better achieved through a different regulatory scheme. The
performance and experience of the Los Angeles-San Francisco market demon-
strates that alternative systems may function better in fact as well as in theory.
IllI. CALIFORNIA, A TEST CASE
A. Evidence
In view of the comprehensive character of the Civil Aeronautics Act and
the present worldwide agreement that entry and fare restrictions are neces-
sary,58 it is not surprising that only one major unregulated market exists in
the entire world. What is surprising is that this market - air transportation
between Los Angeles and the San Francisco-Oakland area - is the largest in
the world. Although this market is within the extensive operational jurisdic-
tion of the FAA, it is not within the more limited economic jurisdiction of the
CAB. The economic provisions of the Act do not apply to carriers supplying
purely local transportation between these two cities because they are within the
same state, and transportation can be conducted without overflying another
state or international waters 9° Certificated domestic trunk carriers flying this
route are subject to both Board and California Public Utilities Commission
regulation, but carriers operating purely intrastate are subject only to the juris-
diction of the Commission. Although the Commission has power to regulate
airline rates, it does so very flexibly.6° The Commission is required by statute
to hold inquiries into fare increases and decreases so marked that there is
reason to believe that the fare is non-compensatory, but it makes a practice of
57. 72 Stat. 740,49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
58. "Nobody has ever advocated unregulated competition." From an aditorial in
Flight International, Feb. 25, 1965, p. 273.
59. Hence such transportation is not "interstate air transportation" within the meaning
of the Act (49 U.S.C. § 1301(21)) and not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board.
Because the safety jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Agency applies to "civil aircraft
in air commerce" (49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)) and the definition of "air commerce" (49 U.S.C,
§ 1301(4)) is more inclusive than that of "interstate air transportation," carriage of
passengers by air between the cities is subject to federal safety regulation.
60. The only recent important case in which the Commission exercised its power
over rates was in Western Airlines, Inc., 62 Cal. P.U.C. 553 (1964) (Dec. No. 67077) in
which a fare differential based on which airport a passenger used for travel over the
routes under study was held to discriminate against Oakland and Long Beach passengers
and was therefore illegal.
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approving virtually all changes. It cannot regulate entry.01 Nor can it require
service to any point, grant subsidy, or limit the route pattern of any enter-
prise.62 As a result, the California intrastate markets are relatively unregu-
lated and, by world standards, are virtually free markets.0
61. INTRASTATE AiR C.mus ni CA;iomrr. 60-61.
62. Id. at 54-67.
63. The CAB, in 1954, attempted to subject the intrastate carriers to the Act. but
the result was inconclusive and the matter was apparently dropped. CAB v. Friedkin
Aeronautics, Inc., 246 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1957). Seven years later, Alan S. Boyd, then
Chairman of the CAB, complimented the performance of Pacific Southwest Airlines, (the
largest of the intrastate carriers) and indicated the Board's intention to refrain from inter-
fering with its operations. INTRASTATE Am CARRIms nr CALTroaiw I 97. He indicated, how-
ever, that the Board retained an interest in intrastate operations and might some day feel
compelled to exert jurisdiction. Id. at 107-08 But the Board has not always acted as gener-
ously toward Pacific Southwest (for example it has refused to allow PSA to knowingly
accept the reservations or solicit the business of travelers from outside the state, id. at 7-8
and has attacked attempts to establish an intrastate system elsewhere. In the best-known
and most recent of these incidents, the Board strenuously contested a ruling of the
Hawaiian Public Service Commission authorizing Island Airlines, a coach carrier, to
fly in competition with Hawaiian Airlines and Aloha Airlines, both CAB-certificated and
subsidized. The state had supported the activities of Island because it hoped that Island
would provide cheaper transportation than that provided by the CAB-certificated carriers.
The Board contended that, because the transportation between the islands took place in
part over international waters, the authorized transportation was "interstate air trans-
portation" within the meaning of the Act, and subject solely to its jurisdiction. The Board
was upheld in the Federal District Court, and an injunction was granted. CAB v. Island
Airlines, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 990 (D.C. Hawaii 1964).
In California, state groups urged from time to time that the Public Utilities Com-
mission be given broader regulatory powers. These suggestions were refined into a bill
which periodically was introduced in the California Legislature, most recently as Assembly
Bill No. 413, 1965 Session. To the author's great regret, the bill was passed and signed
into law on June 17, 1965. The text of this Comment was prepared prior to the passage
of the act and does not reflect this development.
The new act as passed amends Part 2 of Division I of the Public Utilities Code by
adding a chapter (Chapter 4) regulating intrastate passenger air carriers. It gives the
Public Utilities Commission full powers to regulate entry, rates, and such matters as
ticketing, reservations, baggage handling and advertising. It does not provide for subsidy
or compulsory service to unprofitable points. The Act contains a grandfather clause so
worded that PSA is the only carrier likely to be eligible for a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity, without which no intrastate carrier is permitted to operate.
It has been asserted that the certificates established by the act are merely certificates
of fitness and that the act provides a regulatory scheme much less restrictive than that
administered by the C.A.B. Interview with J. Floyd Andrews, President, P.S.A, Oakland,
Calif., Jan. 5, 1965. Unfortunately, the language of the act does not support this interpre-
tation. It provides standards for carrier selection which bear a disquieting resemblance
to those of the Federal Act. Cal. Pub.U.C.A., Div. 1, Part 2, Chap. 4, Art. 2, §§ 2750,
2751, 2752, 2753, 2757, 2759, 2762, 2763 (1965). It is possible, of course, that the Com-
mission will administer its new mandate with a gentle hand. Before the passage of the
Act, some members of the Commission had taken the position that the free market had
served California well in keeping fares at a reasonable level and providing the kind and
quality of service required by the public. Frederick B. Holoboff, President, California
Public Utilities Commission, testimony before California Legislature, Ilr" smr'n Am
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Although the Los Angeles-San Francisco market has always been an im-
portant one, it was the fifth largest in the United States in 1948 04 (in terms
of passenger miles), and became the largest only in 1961.15 Today, more
revenue passengers travel between Los Angeles and San Francisco than be-
tween any-other pair of cities in the world.00 More than 60 round trip non-
stop flights are operated each weekday and more than 75 each Friday, Satur-
day, and Sunday.67 In March, 1965, more than 9,000 persons per day traveled
between the two cities by air.68 The market has grown rapidly (it was only
CARRIERS IN CALIFORNIA 54-67, and interview, San Francisco, California, January 4, 1965,
But others were strongly in favor of more active regulation by the Commission. See, e.g.,
dissent of Commissioner McKeage, Trans World Airlines, Inc., 59 Cal. P.U.C. 722, 727
(1962) (Dec. No. 63814). The elaborate regulatory power granted the Commission by
the act makes it likely that those favoring more stringent regulatory control of intrastate
air transportation will prevail. Such regulation, it has been demonstrated above (text,
Part II, supra), cannot add economic benefits to those already provided by free-market
competition. It cannot even furnish other services, since the act expressly denies the PUC
the powers necessary to do so (§§ 2763, 2764). Regulatory experience elsewhere suggests
that the ultimate result will be government protectionism, the proliferation of inefficient
practices, and oligopolistic market behavior. That Californians have permitted private
firms to receive protection at consumer expense in the guise of protection of the public
interest is eloquent testimony to public and legislative misunderstanding of both the
possibilities ahd limitations of government economic regulation. California today enjoys
the best air transportation available anywhere in the ,world. This transportation has been
provided through the opportunities afforded enterprising firms by the free market.
California's attempt to squeeze further benefits by regulation from a system which has
provided the public with abundant, varied, and inexpensive transportation will very likely
earn the Legislature a place in economic folklore alongside the owner of the goose
that laid the golden eggs.
64. REsEARcH DnvsioN, TRANSPORTATION DEP'T., CALIFORNIA P.U.C. 9 (1949) [here-
inafter cited as P.U.C. REPORT].
65. Aviation Week, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 43.
66. Aviation Week, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 43; Nov. 16, 1964, p. 36.
67. Official Airline Guide, March 15, 1965, pp. 235-236, 407.
68. Calculated from Aviation Week, Apr. 19, 1965, p. 47 and Apr. 26, 1965, p. 40.
Figures on the exact size of the Los Angeles-San Francisco market conflict, principally
because PSA is not required to report traffic figures and is not included in the CA.B.
Origins and Destinations studies. The market figures used in this Comment were com-
piled or calculated from a variety of sources, including Aviation Week, the Airlines them-
selves, interviews, C.A.B. Origins and Destinations, and PSA's Prospectus for its stock
offering of 1963. They have been synthesized where possible, but may occasionally be
inconsistent. The author does not believe that any inconsistencies affect his conclusions.
For example, the 9,000 figure was reached by taking 75% of PSA's traffic for the first
quarter of 1964 (the approximate proportion of PSA's total traffic which can be attributed
to Los Angeles-San Francisco) and dividing it by PSA's market share. For example, the
daily size of the market for the first quarter of 1965 was computed as follows: PSA's
traffic for the first quarter of 1965 was 357,000 passengers. Aviation Week, April 19, 1965,
p. 47. It is commonly assumed that 75% of PSA's traffic moves between Los Angeles
and San Francisco. Thus PSA carried about 267,750 passengers between the two cities
in the first quarter of 1965. Its market share during the six months from September to
March, 1964-65, was 32.8%. Aviation Week, April 26, 1965, p. 40. If its market share is
assumed to be a constant for the six-month period, the entire market averaged 9,069
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3,500 persons per day in 1959)69 and has been characterized by intense com-
petition, a wide variety of marketing strategies, and the lowest overland air
fares in the world.
There are striking contrasts between the performance of this market and
the performance of similar markets in the United States regulated by the CAB.
For example, although the number of passengers traveling by air in the United
States as a whole has increased between the years 1959 and 1964 by approxi-
mately 50 per cent,70 the number of travelers passing between Los Angeles
and San Francisco by air has increased almost 300 per cent.7 ' Although the
average jet coach fare level in the United States is approximately 5.5 cents
per mile over stages considerably longer, and hence cheaper to operate, jet
coach fare for the 350-mile trip from San Francisco to Los Angeles is approxi-
mately 3.9 cents per mile72 Although the lowest fare between Boston and
Washington, served only by CAB-certificated trunk carriers, is $24.65, Pacific
Southwest Airlines, using the same modem turbo-prop equipment, carries pas-
sengers between Los Angeles and San Francisco, only 59 miles closer together,
for $11.43. The jet fare is only $13.503 a In other markets, obsolescent though
economically viable aircraft have been rapidly retired as new aircraft have been
introduced prematurely, because the fare structure has emphasized premium
service and has not allowed the owner of obsolescent equipment to operate at
a fare reflecting his lower capital costs. In Los Angeles-San Francisco, how-
ever, it has been common to see obsolescent equipment operated at fares re-
flecting the lower capital cost until replaced by new equipment so much more
efficient that the capital cost charges could be amortized at fares which reflected
customer demand for the new equipment.74
This market is also characterized by relatively even traffic levels, without
important daily or seasonal peaks. The market generates both business and
"discretionary" travelers, hence the weekend traffic is slightly greater than the
weekday traffic. But this discretionary travel is not seasonal, as it is in most
vacation markets. This lack of pronounced peaks and dips enables a smaller
carrier without other routes to employ equipment profitably on a consistent
basis. The consistency makes planning more accurate for both large and small
passengers per day during the first quarter of 1965. This estimate is probably conservative,
since PSA's market share was probably higher for the fourth quarter of 1964 than for
the first quarter of 1965.
69. Interview with United Air Lines Staff, Chicago, Ill., Jan. 6, 1965.
70. CAB, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, December 1964, at 1, December 1959, at 1.
71. C.A.B., Aviation Week, Sept. 14, 1964, Dec. 21, 1964, Apr. 26, 1965 at p. 40;
PSA Prospectus, Oct. 24, 1964; Statistics of competing airlines; IRmAsrArtE Axn CAnrams
iN CALiuoRNiA at 55; Western Air Lines, Inc., 62 Cal. P.U.C. 553 (1964) (Dec. No.
67077). See note 68 supra.
72. OFFicL AIA-NE GuImE, June 15, 1965.
73. Id. at 511, 456. All references to fares may be confirmed in the appropriate issue
of OrmcIuc Anaixx GumE, with the exception of the early California intrastate rates,
which may be found in PUC REPOr 7.
74. See text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
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lines and contributes to the high level of efficiency which is both the cause
and effect of lower fares.
Unlike most air transport markets, California is not today primarily a busi-
ness and luxury market. Over 75 per cent of the travel between Los Angeles
and San Francisco takes place by air. In the United States as a whole, only
about 10 per cent of intercity passengers use common carriers at all, and the
airlines carry only about half of this traffic.75
Four carriers are currently important factors in this market.70 Two of them,
United Air Lines and Trans World Airlines, are among the "big four" trunk-
lines. One of them, Western Air Lines, is one of the smallest, though one of the
most profitable, domestic trunk carriers. The other, Pacific Southwest Airlines
(PSA), is an intrastate carrier operating without a CAB certificate between
San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego. PSA is equipped with the most
modem equipment and currently it and United share almost evenly over 70
per cent of the market.
77
The market shares of these airlines have reflected changing circumstances.
General trends have emerged and then been reversed by changing competitive
conditions. For example, United Air Lines' share of the market declined from
a dominating 62 per cent to a barely participating 15 per cent from 1948 to
the Spring of 1964, due to its unwillingness to adapt to changing competitive
conditions. With United's decision to compete in earnest by offering jet ser-
vice at low fares, its share rose rapidly, favored by its image as a "quality"
airline, and it has regained its lost lead. 78 PSA's share rose from insignificant
in 1949 to a high of just over 50 per cent in Spring, 1962 (just before the
first competitive response by the trunklines), and is presently about 35 per
cent. PSA suffered from an equipment disadvantage when United entered its
Boeing 727 jets in the market, but since April 9, 1965, PSA has had 727's of
75. B UREAU OF THE CEnsus, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 01 TIE
UNrrD STATES 570 (8th ed. 1964), INmTASTATE Am CARiEs iN CALYORNIA at 55;
P.U.C. REPORT 14-15.
76. This market is of considerable importance to the carriers operating it, both for
the business it generates directly and in the case of the trunklines, for the advertising
value that it has in influencing the travel-conscious West Coast traveler. For example,
United estimated that in 1964 approximately 35% of its passengers originated or terminated
at Los Angeles or San Francisco. Interview with Blaine Cooke, United Air Lines Vice
President-Marketing, Chicago, Ill., Jan. 6, 1965. Although this includes many flights outside
the market under study, the passengers on such flights were often either California resi-
dents or frequent visitors and hence could be influenced by United's participation In the
Los Angeles-San Francisco market. As a result, United regards its identity in this market
as important for advertising purposes. A guess might place the figure for a similar
measurement of Western's traffic even higher than that for United. (Los Angeles and
San Francisco are the two largest metropolitan areas on Western's domestic system,
which includes only nine large centers of population. The Los Angeles-San Francisco
route alone accounted for 10% of Western's passengers in December 1963).




its own and is regaining lost ground. 9 Western, traditionally a poor second to
United among CAB-certificated carriers (1961 share: about 18 per cent),
experienced spectacular growth starting in June, 1962, when it initiated low-
fare services.80 Its market penetration reached a high of around 35 per cent,81
but it failed to respond quickly enough to United's jet bid and its market share
is now approximately 19 per cent.8 2 Western has introduced jet service and
is trying to regain some of its lost share. TWA was traditionally a follower
in the market, with a historic market share of about 5 per cent.P Recently it
has promoted an aggressive pricing policy on its jet services and has increased
its share to about 10.5 per cent8 4
At the beginning of 1949 United, Western, and TWA, certificated by the
CAB, were the only carriers operating in the market8 , The generally high
fare levels, the absence of restrictions on entry, the prevailing optimism about
the future of air transportation, and the availability of used war-surplus trans-
ports stimulated the development of a group of small intrastate carriers in
California.86 Low capital costs, minimum services, and high density seating
kept unit costs low. By the end of the first year of operation only three of these
lines - California Central, Pacific Southwest and Western Airlines of Cali-
fornia - remained as significant factors in the market.87 (WAL of California,
which leased equipment from and allegedly was financed by Western Airlines,
Inc. is generally acknowledged to have been a "fighting ship" set up by West-
ern for the purpose of driving the other operators out of business.88) These
"coach-class" carriers operated at rates which were less than half those charged
79. Aviation Week, May 10, 1965, p. 47.
80. Aviation Week, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 43.
81. Interview, Blaine Cook, supra note 76.
82. Aviation Week, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 40.
83. Aviation Week, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 43.
84. Aviation Week, May 10, 1965, p. 47.
85. In 1948, United had about 62% of the traffic and Western about 29%. Gui. &
BATES, AIRLINE COmaPETrrION 357 (1949).
86. First of these was California Central Airlines, followed by Robbin Airvays,
Pacific Southwest Airlines, California Arrow Airlines, and Western Airlines of California.
87. P.U.C. REPORT 24-40. PSA was started as an adjunct to a flying school in San
Diego and had in operation only two DC-3 aircraft. California Central Airlines and
Western Airlines of California were flying DC-4 aircraft at this time, and PSA acquired
such aircraft in 1955.
88. This view of Western Air Lines of California seems justified by the PUC RPoar
at 38, which states:
The DC-4 aircraft with high density seating capacity is leased under terms of
a contract in which Western Air Lines, Inc. provides, maintains, and operates the
aircraft of the Western Air Lines of California operation.
The carier has limited the duration of its present tariff to three months.
In view of the fact that the operation was achieving load factors of approximately
80% (Id. at 39) and the PUC estimate was that such an operation could achieve a 10%
return on investment at 58.8% load factor (Id. at 56), Western's withdrawal from the
intrastate market in 1950 is suspect, unless it had never intended to remain.
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by the certificated airlines (then $21.05 on United Airlines and TWA; $20.00
on Western Airlines), and were more or less ignored by United, TWA, and
by Western's certificated operations.89 The new lines were an immediate pub-
lic success and experienced load factors as high as 85 per cent. However, most
of them were thinly financed and poorly managed. The largest, California Cen-
tral Airlines, had considerable labor and management difficulties and finally
went out of business in 1955. The smallest was PSA.
PSA was in insecure financial condition from 1952 to 1956 but by 1957 it
was operating profitably, earning $196,606 in that year on revenues of $2,786,-
658.90 In 1958, its last full year of piston operation, PSA's earnings rose to
$322,000 on revenues of $3,516,000 and it carried 296,000 revenue passen-
gers.9' In November of 1959, the carrier received its first three Lockheed
Electras, modern turbo-prop aircraft designed for short-to-medium haul trans-
portation. In 1960, its first full year operating this equipment, the carrier
transported 621,000 passengers for revenues of $7,545,309.92 According to the
figures of a competitor, PSA carried 28 per cent of the total traffic between
Los Angeles and San Francisco that year, as compared with 13 per cent the
year before.93 By 1962 (its competitors still had failed to respond), PSA had
increased its market penetration to 43 per cent and was now operating five
Electras. 94 The market had grown from an average of 3,500 passengers per
day in 1959 to 4,200 in 1962.95
On June 1, 1962, a trunk carrier for the first time responded to the com-
petitive threat posed by PSA. Western Airlines initiated a $12.95 "Thriftair"
fare between the two cities, operating obsolescent and fully depreciated DC-6B
aircraft in a high-density 92-seat configuration. PSA's fare was $13.50 at the
time. Western, traditionally opposed to unusually low fares, was able to oper-
ate at this low fare because it had no capital costs on the aircraft involved.
The new service was an instant success, attracting either passengers who were
interested in the lowest rate possible, or who were too timid to fly PSA be-
cause of its somewhat "unofficial" image (resulting from its lack of federal
certification). Thriftair became even more successful when Western abandoned
the inconvenient "air bus" feature and began accepting reservations. Western's
share of the market went from 15 per cent in 1961 to 32 per cent by the end of
89. Western attempted a fare experiment in 1949 whereby in return for dropping
meal service it lowered its tariff 5%. This was allowed by the CAB, but the differential
proved too small to attract significant amounts of traffic and Western dropped this fare
differential in October, 1949. In any case, this tariff was filed before the intrastate carriers
commenced operations and was not a response to them, although the existence of the
intrastate carriers may have hastened its demise. CHERRINGTON, op. Cit. supra note 41, at
368-73.
90. PSA Prospectus Oct. 24, 1963.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Interview, United Air Lines, supra note 76.
94. Aviation Week, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 43. PSA Prospectus, Oct. 24, 1963, p. 8,
95. Aviation Week, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 43.
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1963, mostly at United's expense.96 The market continued to grow very rapidly
reaching 6,800 passengers per day by the end of 1963.0" On February 25, 1963,
Western reduced its Thriftair fare to $11.43 to increase the differential between
its own and PSA's fares and thus minimize the diversionary effect of PSA's
more modem Electra equipment. United's introduction of Jet Commuter ser-
vice in the autumn of 1964 damaged Western's competitive position. Its now-
obsolete piston equipment was inadequate competition for PSA's Electra turbo-
props and United's Boeing 727 jets. Western ordered four Boeing 720B's (the
type it operates on long-haul routes) with special high-density seating (146
seats) for use on its California routes. It reduced but did not eliminate its
DC-6B Thriftair schedules in an attempt to maintain market identity pending
the introduction of the jets on April 1, 1965.
In September of 1964, after its share of the market had shrunk from 62 per
cent in 1949 to 15 per cent in June of 1964,'8 United became a serious com-
petitor. It introduced two of its brand-new Boeing 727 jets, aircraft designed
specifically for high frequency operation over short routes and offering very
low aircraft-mile costs and correspondingly low seat-mile costs. These aircraft
were operated exclusively between the two cities, creating an airline-within-
an-airline. They were set up in a high-density configuration (114 seats) and
were offered at $14.50 one way, only one dollar higher than PSA's Electra
fare. Although the Boeing 727 as operated by United over this route does not
offer a significant time advantage over PSA's turboprop aircraft,00 the demon-
strated consumer preference for new aircraft and jet service permitted this fare
differential.
United's new service was immediately successful, and ultimately regained
for it the leadership position which it had abdicated. Its well-tried marketing
image, the new equipment, and the low fare attracted passengers, especially
businessmen (who have traditionally favored United). Load factors were
about 80 per cent, the maximum tolerable without passenger inconvenience in
an operation of this kind. Initially, United operated four round trips per day
using two aircraft. Within six months, it had increased the frequency to twenty
round trips per day using four aircraft. Advertising stimulated traffic. M'arket
growth was spectacular. Even with United's quintupled scheduling, load fac-
tors remained at a comfortable and profitable two-thirds. 1 0
Despite the new competition, PSA's traffic continued to grow, although at a
slower rate. To compete with United, it ordered six Boeing 727 jets for service
96. See note 68 supra for methods used in calculating market data.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. This is because of the relatively short distance between tihe two cities and the
elaborate air traffic procedures which United's method of operation requires. PSA usually
flies VFR (Visual Flight Rules) (interview with AV. R. Crandall, rice President, PSA,
Oaldand, Calif., Jan. 5, 1965), thus omitting time-consuming instrument approaches and
departures. United flies IFR (Instrument Flight Rules). PSA flies the route in its Electra
in 60 minutes, while United's 727 flies it in 55 minutes.
100. Aviation Week, Apr. 12, 1965, p. 42.
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which started April 9, 1965. It is operating these jets at $13.50 (the former
Electra fare between San Francisco and Los Angeles), and United has lowered
its $14.50 fare to match PSA. Western's Boeing 720B jets are offered at the
$13.50 fare.
TWA acquired unrestricted rights between Los Angeles and San Francisco
from the CAB in the Pacific Southwest Local Service case. 101 In view of the
fierce competition it has not exercised these rights and carries passengers only
incidentally to its interstate service. Faced with a shortage of jet equipment,
especially the Boeing 727, it apparently finds this fiercely competitive market,
demanding its best equipment and energies, less attractive than the cartelized
North Atlantic run or protected transcontinental runs. TWA charges the pre-
vailing jet fare on the local portion of interstate flights originating or terminat-
ing at San Francisco or Los Angeles. It can do this because the service can be
priced on a marginal-cost basis, since the seats would not otherwise be filled
and the flights would operate anyway. TWA's market penetration rarely rises
above 10 per cent, 02 and its chief importance to the structure of the market is
as a potential competitor should one of the leaders falter.
Competition has in the past prevented the market from becoming static, and
the participants are now preparing for an uncertain but promising future. Be-
cause of the great productivity of PSA's and Western's jets, the capacity on
this route will soon be at least tripled compared with September, 1964.103 Any
over-capacity problem might be even more acute if PSA does not change its
decision to retain its Electras. They could still be sold at a favorable price in
view of the Electra's high resale value. PSA will have to find or make a market
for capacity 3Y2 times its March output.
Western's four-engine, 250,000 pound Boeing 720B is hardly the ideal air-
craft for short haul operation. Although its aircraft-mile cost is quite low for a
plane of its size 104 and its seat-mile cost perhaps even lower than the 727's, it
is a very large economic unit. Since its full capacity will be used only at peak
periods, the high capital costs, the high aircraft-mile cost, the complicated
ground servicing requirements and longer turn-around time may make it diffi-
cult to compete effectively on the route. Western's allocation of 720B's to this
route may signify a return to the "fighting-ship" philosophy that occasioned
the establishment of Western Airlines of California in 1949.105 Now, as then,
their capital commitment is such that the aircraft could be returned to regular
services, were Western to decide either that the experiment had succeeded in
101. 35 C.A.B, 50 (1962).
102. Supra notes 83-84.
103. Western's 720B seats 146 and its DC-6B seats 92; P.S.A.'s 727 seats 122 and
its Electra seats 98; United's 727 seats 114.
104. Aviation Week, "Operating Costs of Turbine Aircraft in Airline Service," May
31, 1965 at 36-37.
105. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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eliminating the "upstart" competition or that, as in 1949, such tactics were
doomed to failure. It could then convert the 720B's into its normal configura-
tion for use on more appropriate routes. 08 Western might offer San Francisco
to Los Angeles seats on its interstate flights south, and Los Angeles to San
Francisco seats on its interstate flights north. This would enable them to main-
tain some market identity, much in the same way as TWA does.
United has considerable resources, including over sixty Boeing 727 jets in
service or on order, so that if necessary more aircraft could be committed to the
market. The use of this equipment would not be costless. Aside from the oppor-
tunity cost of not using it elsewhere, United must convert this equipment, since
it operates the 727 on the Los Angeles-San Francisco route in a seating con-
figuration not used elsewhere.
B. Conclusions
The economic evils which the air transport industry and its regulators fear
will occur without regulation have not materialized in the Los Angeles-San
Francisco market. Competition has not been "ruinous." Despite low fare levels,
efficient firms have been able to operate profitably. PSA, with no other im-
portant source of income, has operated at a profit since 1957, and continues to
do so in the face of competition from United. 07 United's Jet Commuter ser-
vice has been profitable.'08 During the 1962-1964 period, Thriftair returned a
profit for Western, but market developments since United's lov-fare entry have
turned this profit into a loss. Western's active promotion of its "Fanjet Com-
muter" suggests that it believes it can make a profit with the new service, but
the overcapacity situation which the new equipment has created makes it al-
most certain that one of the competitors will be badly burned. Past history
suggests that the burned party will be the least efficient or least adaptable firm.
This market has, from the introduction of intrastate coach-class service in
1949, rewarded handsomely effective marketing and operation and penalized
ruthlessly poor judgment and inefficiency.
PSA's success refutes the contention that air transport is a natural-monopoly
industry. Once minimum efficient size has been readied, larger scale does not
confer cost advantages. There is evidence that PSA's operating costs are lower
than either United's or Western's.109 PSA's operation is notable for its effi-
106. It could use the reconverted 720B's on its applied-for Hawaii route, on which
no government action has been taken, or on routes awarded in the Pacific Northwest-
Southwest Service Case, C.A.B. Docket No. 15459, ct al. now pending before the Board.
107. PSA Prospectus, Oct. 24, 1963, p. 4; PSA Annual Report to Shareholders, 1964;
Aviation Week, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 4 3.
108. Interview with Blaine Cooke, Chicago, Jan. 6, 1965.
109. PSA achieves a higher utilization of its equipment than its competitors, thus
achieving lower capital costs per unit output. Its fuel costs are lower, because its captains
spend less time on approach and climb-out due to PSA's flight procedure (see text
accompanying note 112 infra). Since the days when its DC-3's had 31 seat-, compared
to the 28 of its competitors, PSA has always managed somehow to squeeze a few extra
seats into the aircraft it operates. Its 727's have 122 seats, compared to United's 114, be-
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ciency, fresh thinking, and high level of customer acceptance. 110 It is clear that
no other carrier, including United with its enormous resources (1964 revenues
more than thirty times PSA's), is a more effective competitor in this market.
PSA has an operation well-suited to the particular needs of its route. It pre-
serves both an underdog appeal to the public, and an identification as a Cali-
fornia product. It has had no difficulty financing the purchase of the most
modern equipment and in this respect can only be equalled and not surpassed
by its larger competitors. PSA may even have an advantage over Western,
whose commitments to other routes influence it in such a way as to prevent
its competing with maximum efficiency in the Los Angeles-San Francisco mar-
ket. For example, rather than purchase 727's for the route, Western chose to
standardize its equipment and purchased less appropriate 72013's which were
already in service on its longer routes. PSA, with a fleet geared specifically
to the California commuter market, and United, with its vast, diversified fleet,
are in better technological positions than Western, which is neither small
enough to specialize nor large enough to diversify.
PSA may even have advantages over United. Geared as it is to service in
markets which emphasize premium passenger comfort and which have pro-
tected entry and fare structures, United is not experienced in the kind of mar-
keting, passenger-handling and aircraft-handling techniques demanded by an
unprotected market with an experienced and sophisticated clientele. PSA's
small size makes it a less tempting target for unionization. This advantage
makes possible more flexible use of personnel. PSA's flight operations are
more informal than either United's or Western's, and captains have more dis-
cretion in flight planning and execution. For example, in the favorable flying
weather which is usual in California, PSA's captains fly VFR (Visual Flight
Rules). This permits them to omit lengthy instrument approaches and depar-
tures, and results in a consistent 15 per cent reduction in flight time, which
saves money for PSA.1 2 United and Western operate their California routes
IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) in uniformity with their other routes, most
of which are operated under less favorable flying conditions.
Lack of regulation has not caused chaos in California. Unregulated entry
and price competition have not resulted in a multitude of tiny firms scrambling
for passengers to the confusion of the general public. As the California market
developed, advanced technology and effective marketing became essential to
cause PSA ordered its equipment without full galleys, since meals are not served on
this route. United, having ordered its 727's with its system needs in mind, carries the
veight and space of the idle equipment. At most times the extra seats make no difference,
but at peak hours, when the load factor approaches 100%, the extra seats mean extra
revenue.
110. See also Aviation Week, July 1, 1963, p. 48; July 8, 1963, p. 37.
111. C.A.B. Air Carrier Financial Statistics, Sept. 30, 1964, p. 17, line 13; Aviation
Week, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 43.
112. Operating time is less for a given amount of revenue, hence unit costs are
lower, more revenue hours may be flown on the same capital investment.
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profitable operation; and it became increasingly difficult for a thinly-capitalized
fringe operator to survive. Ultimately, no more than three important competi-
tors remained, along with TWA's holding operation and, periodically, a fringe
operator trying to find a niche in the market.
The history of Trans California Airlines illustrates the difficulties faced by
a fringe operator in a mature competitive market. Trans California commenced
operations in the summer of 1962. The line operated four obsolete piston-
engined Constellations and charged a fare of $10.99 one way and $21.00 round
trip. It ceased operations in the fall of 1964, apparently unable to make a profit,
although it was carrying more than 10,000 passengers per month at the time
of its demise.113 The fare structure is so competitive in this market that it was
unable to continue operating at fares low enough to attract passengers to its
obsolete equipment.
Caves, in a discussion of capital barriers to entry and market structures, 4
cites a study by United Research, Inc., in concluding that four or five carriers
are the most a well-developed short to medium-haul market can support at
any one time.115 Both marketing and technological costs account for this limita-
tion.116 This analysis is borne out by the California experience, and indicates
that the public has little to fear from unregulated entry. Participants in a mar-
ket will be naturally limited to a number which ensures both competition and
technical efficiency without chaos. The free-entry California market has and
will have for the immediate future approximately the same structure - two
to three major carriers - as most regulated routes.11 7 The important question
is whether these carriers ought to be chosen administratively or by the com-
petitive forces of the-market. And the important difference is that transporta-
tion by air in the California unregulated market can be purchased for half to
seven-tenths as much as it costs elsewhere.
Structural stability should not be confused with stagnation. Although the
number of finns servicing a market will remain (and have remained in Cali-
fornia) more or less constant over time, no particular firm is guaranteed con-
tinued participation. There are no barriers to entry in the California market
sufficient to protect an entrenched firm from its own inefficiency or uncom-
{petitive pricing. PSA's successful entry in 1949 at the expense of then en-
trenched United attests to the ease of entry at that time. Now, PSA is strongly
in favor of the licensing bill currently before the legislature.118 Certain of a
certificate if the bill were to be enacted, PSA insists that some official distinc-
113. 62 Cal. P.U.C., 553, 558 (1964) (Dec. No. 67077).
114. Caves, op. cit. supra note 42, at 84-97.
115. Id. at 96.
116. Ibid. This is in part because substantial scheduling and therefore substantial in-
vestment is required to create and maintain even a minimum market "identity."
117. T.W.A. cannot be considered a major carrier on this route.
118. INTRAsTATE Am CARRmRs iN CAUIFORNIA at 6; contrast with the statement by
L. A. Mudgett, President of Trans California Airlines (a firm which had not been able
to find a niche in the market), Id. at 31-33.
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tion should protect it from the inroads of new competition. This attitude is a
recognition that there is an ever-present possibility of new competition in this
market. Absolute capital requirements are now considerably greater than in
1949 and the war-surplus aircraft market no longer provides obsolescent equip-
ment at greatly reduced cost, but barriers to entry have not prevented new
competition from materializing in the recent past. Although Trans California
was unable to survive and a prospective entrant, California Airlines, has been
unable to create a sufficiently stable capital structure to satisfy the FAA's
safety requirements, neither line's difficulties stem from entry barriers. Rather,
fares are so low and service so good that there is little unsatisfied consumer
demand. Hence, capital is not attracted to the market. If the fares were to rise
or the service to deteriorate, new opportunities for profit might well attract
new capital.
Low fares, intensive advertising and constant innovation in service account
for the spectacular growth of the Los Angeles-San Francisco market. This
growth indicates that at least here there is elasticity of demand for air trans-
portation. In 1949, a Public Utilities Commission survey disclosed that only
34 per cent of all passengers using the newly created and inexpensive uncer-
tificated airlines had been diverted from regular certificated carriers.11 9 The re-
maining 65 per cent either had been diverted from surface transportation, or
but for the inexpensive air transportation would have taken no trip at all.i"O
Thus the intrastate carriers themselves were the first impact on the market.
PSA acquired Electra equipment in 1959 and almost doubled its passenger
traffic that year. Two years later, its traffic had almost doubled again. Even
more important, during this three year period, while passengers carried in air
transportation had increased for the United States as a whole by only 10 per
cent, the California market had grown by 30 per cent.12 1 When Western intro-
duced Thriftair in 1962, the market expanded significantly; and Western's fare
reduction on Thriftair in 1963 resulted in spectacular market growth. United's
well-advertised introduction of low fare jet service almost doubled its patron-
age in the first nine months of operation. Between 1959 and 1964 while the
United States market grew by only 50 per cent, the California market grew
by 300 per cent.'
2 2
Both the 1949 survey and the continuing attraction of great members of
travelers to air transportation suggest that the high level of discretionary traf-
fic over this route is an effect of low fares. The coincidence of innovation in
service plus fare reductions and spectacular market growth suggests that in-
novation and low fares have in large part caused the market growth.
Despite the impressive and continuing "coincidence" of innovation, fare re-
duction and market growth, some observers trace the growth to causes other
119. RIasFARca DmVISXoN, TRANSPORTATION DEP'T., CALIFORNIA P.U.C., REPORT, 15, 23.
120. Id. at 15.
121. CAB Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, Dec. 1959, Dec. 1961. See note 68 supra.
122. See notes 60 and 61.
[Vol. 74: 14161442
AIR TRANSPORT REGULATION
than lack of regulation. Western Airlines, for instance, takes the position that:
[Los Angeles-San Francisco] ... has become the world's busiest air route
because of certain distinctive peculiarities which pertain to no other route.
Most important is that the route links two large metropolitan areas
within the same state. This enables intrastate carriers to operate without
regulations by the CAB.
The two cities are 340 air miles apart. Nowhere are there two such
large cities that far apart in the same state. Furthermore, the distance is
just a bit too far for comfortable ground travel.
Los Angeles and San Francisco are located in the fastest growing part
of the country. Historically, however, this development has been recent.
These cities have grown to maturity essentially in the Air Age. Ground
transportation between the two cities is not as well developed as in the
East. There are, for example, only two main highways and one railroad.
Another unique feature of this market is that the two cities - though
in the same state - are quite different. Each has its own tourist attrac-
tions, its own charm, and a different climate.
There is far greater difference between these two cities than between
New York and Boston, which comprise the second busiest air route in the
world.123
These assertions are incorrect, or at least very misleading.
That the two cities are 340 air miles apart is not unusual, unless their loca-
tion within the same state has been crucial to market development. There are
other city-pairs 340 air miles apart or more which exchange large amounts of
air traffic which have not experienced the same growth. Location of the two
cities within the same state may create certain commercial and social ties. But
there is a similar if not quite as extensive community of interest among the
cities of the Northeast corridor (Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Wash-
ington) and between Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and New York.
Whatever "distinctive peculiarities" may account for the heavy traffic be-
tween Los Angeles and San Francisco, that traffic need not move by air.
Ground transportation, according to the article limited to two main highways
and one railroad, is as adequate here as elsewhere. Between Chicago and
Cleveland there is one main highway and one railroad, between Chicago and
Pittsburgh one main highway and one railroad, between Chicago and New
York one main highway and two passenger railroads, between New York and
Washington one main highway and one railroad, and between New York and
Boston one main highway and one railroad.
On the other hand, Western takes note of the fact that the intrastate carriers
can operate this route without CAB regulation. This is an implicit admission
that the stimulus of competition has been an important factor in market de-
velopment. The spurts in development in 1949, 1959, and 1962 have coincided
too closely with competitive innovation to be discounted as accidental. 2
4
123. Flight Times, Sept.-Oct. 1964, pp. 1, 13-14.
124. Representatives of United and the California P.U.C. agreed that the services
would not have been offered without the existence of the interstate carriers. Interview,
Blaine Cooke, supra note 76. Interview, F. Holoboff, supra note 63.
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IV. A PROPOSAL
Regulation of United States air transportation is predicated upon erroneous
economic assumptions and results in unnecessarily high fares, disguised in-
efficiencies (such as premature replacement of equipment) and a lack of
genuinely diversified service. The CAB should draw a lesson for national regu-
lation from the Los Angeles-San Francisco market and amend the present
regulatory scheme so that all markets are freed from restrictive economic regu-
lation. The result of such deregulation would be to introduce competitive pric-
ing on much of the national air transportation system.
Competitive pricing is unlikely to appeal to those who benefit from the pro-
tection built into the present system. The trunklines, currently protected against
any real risk of demise, would undoubtedly object that the result of their
twenty-five years of hard work was being taken from them. The knowledge
that at least $400,000,000 has been given them in direct subsidy 125 as a reward
for their efforts or that the opportunities for unfettered competition would be
almost unlimited probably would not pacify them. Despite Western's doubling
of its market share between 1961 and 1963 - a period during which its only
important service change was the introduction of low-fare services - Western
has been one of the most vociferous opponents of experimental fare reductions.
And PSA, having benefited by the opportunity to enter the market free of
artificial restraints, now supports legislation which would end that freedom."2"
The free market affords opportunities to entrepreneurs from which already
established firms seek to protect themselves.
Present beneficiaries of internal subsidy would probably oppose deregulation.
Of course, subsidized service could be continued, but in a deregulated system
the burden would fall on the beneficiaries, national or local, rather than on
economically unrelated consumers. Localities accustomed to having others pay
for local benefits are unlikely to welcome the opportunity to carry the burden
themselves.
Any attempted deregulation would no doubt be accompanied by the usual
industry warnings of impaired safety. 27 California shows that an unregulated
market is not inherently unsafe. PSA has never experienced a fatal accident.
The most recent intrastate entrant, Trans California, experienced no safety
problems during the two years it was in operation. The FAA will continue to
125. AIRLiN~s 17. I have deliberately refrained from attempting the difficult task of
estimating the amount of subsidy contained in trunkline service mail rates. Whatever the
amount, it should be added to the figures given in the text. "In addition, the airlines have
been provided with enormous indirect subsidies in the form of airways and traffic control
systems and federal subsidy to airports.
126. PSA's position was that it was merely trying to protect itself and the public
from unscrupulous and ill-equipped operators. For this it depends upon the argument that
certificates established by the new Act are certificates of fitness, and not attempts at
adjudicating the economic need for the service proposed.
127. See note 17 supra.
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enforce safety standards as prerequisites to entry and continued operation.Y2
It can always raise the standards or expand its enforcement activities.
Competitive pricing could be introduced on present-day routes either simply
by abandoning route restrictions on existing trunklines, or by allowing entry
to any qualified applicant. In either case carriers would still be required to file
tariffs and adhere to them. Changes would be made simply by notice. Adher-
ence to tariffs would prevent chaos and ensure sufficient certainty to enable
consumers to calculate costs conveniently. However, abandoning route restric-
tions by allowing existing trunklines to compete would be unnecessarily re-
strictive. One of the reasons for PSA's success is that it "specializes" in
accommodating itself to the needs of a particular market. Such specialists
might well establish themselves elsewhere if given the chance. Furthermore, in
California many innovations and efficiencies have been generated by carriers
trying to establish themselves in a market where other carriers already have
competitive "identities." Low-fare service, better operational and passenger-
handling techniques, and new marketing approaches have all been pioneered
in California by the intrastate carriers. Similarly, in the national market, the
non-scheduled airlines provided the impetus for the trunk carriers to initiate
coach service. The established trunk lines resisted this innovation.
Moreover, the airspace is public property, restrictions on the use of which
were initially imposed in response to fears of economic evils. Since examina-
tion of the Los Angeles-San Francisco market shows that these fears are un-
justified, there is no reason why we need continue to deny the opportunity to
serve the public to those prepared to risk capital to do so. It is neither wise
political nor economic policy to mark out an area of activity as the preserve
of a few corporations who have the good fortune to have been operating on
May 14, 1938. If these corporations, with their vast e-perience and talent
resources, are able to adapt to competition, they should find themselves better
off for it - more flexible, free of government interference, and expanding
rapidly as previously untapped markets are developed. If not, it is to the pub-
lic's advantage that the operation of the air transportation system be placed in
more capable hands.
Allowing any qualified applicant to operate on competitive routes would pro-
vide a maximum competitive impetus to the market. This approach would
decentralize investment decisions, eliminate the possibility of collusive agree-
ments between grandfather carriers, and reward entrepreneurial talent. Market
composition would no longer be selected arbitrarily, and public air space would
become a public resource.
128. It has already delayed the entry of a new competitor in the San Francisco-Los
Angeles market This is California Airlines, which has been trying for over a year to
raise financial resources to start operating Caravelle equipment from the San Francisco
Bay Area to Southern California. To date, the FAA has not been satisfied as to the
new line's financial stability. Telephone interview, Mr. IR. Maus, President, California
Airlines, December 30, 1964.
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However, the political opposition from established carriers and subsidized
communities which is certain to attend any attempted deregulation will most
likely require a cautious CAB to adopt a more limited approach. But discre-
tion is the better part of caution. If the CAB were to experiment by selecting
one market to be deregulated provisionally, the established carriers might en-
sure the experiment's failure. They could price below cost, regarding the result-
ing loss as an investment, since the "failure" of the experiment would mean a
return to protection and an opportunity to recoup.
Opening several markets at one time would make destructive tactics by the
trunk carriers less likely, since the investment required would be greater and
any attempt to compensate by requesting fare increases on their protected
routes could be frustrated by an alert CAB. The difficulty with this approach
is that the likelihood of the experiment proceeding without artificial distortion
will increase as more traffic is affected, but so will the political opposition. The
higher the rate of deregulation the greater the expected outcry from estab-
lished carriers and "desubsidized" communities.
Perhaps the most politically viable alternative would be for the Board to
select a limited number of new carriers to compete in high-density markets.
Although this is not the most satisfactory alternative from an economic stand-
point, the certification and subsequent performance of Trans Caribbean Air-
ways in the New York-San Juan market demonstrates that such carriers, if
properly selected, could dramatically effect existing fare levels and service pat-
terns.129 This approach would not produce the flexibility and self-regulation
characteristic of a free market. Nor would it cure the present system's defect
of requiring administrative determinations on matters which would be better
left to the market.
Despite difficulties, deregulation, whether complete, partial, or even experi-
mental, is worth trying. It would cost the public nothing and could point the
way to a new era of mass travel. Even completely free entry would not lead
to monopoly or cut-throat competition, but to a stable market configuration in
which individual competitors would change relative market shares or even go
out of business, but in which no more than a few carriers would operate at any
one time. Free entry would not lead to oligopoly because entry costs are not
129. Trans Caribbean, formerly an irregular carrier, was certificated by the Board
in 1957. 26 C.A.B. 72. A temporary certificate was granted on the condition that the
carrier develop a low fare service. Even before Trans Caribbean received its certificate,
Pan American and Eastern (the then existing carriers on the route), lowered fares to the
level of Trans Caribbean's proposed tariff. The market has grown rapidly, and Trans
Caribbean has been a consistent force for low fare levels. Service at the "thrift," or
lowest, fare, constituted much less than half the New York-San Juan traffic in tile two
years before Trans Caribbean was certificated. Trans Caribbean's aggressive promotion
of even lower fares, and the competitive responses forced on American and Eastern as
a result; almost doubled traffic in six years. Over 90% of the traffic at the new level
travelled at the lowest fare. Trans Caribbean Airways, Direct Exhibit before the Civil
Aeronautics Board, United States-Caribbean-South America Investigation, Docket No.
12895, 1965, Exhibits TC-151, p. 1; TC-156, p. 1; TC-155, p. 1.
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too high to discourage potential competitors 120 and the established firms would
therefore be forced to keep fares low enough to avoid attracting new entrants.
Subsidized service could be retained, eliminated, or modified.
Nothing prevents the Board from liberally construing the licensing pro-
visions of the Act.131 Nothing would "preserve the inherent advantages of air
transportation"' 3 2 so well as permitting its active development on the widest
scale. Nothing could as effectively accomplish the "promotion, encouragement
and development of civil aeronautics,"l13 as regulation which promoted high
output and the prosperity of the most efficient. And nothing would as dramat-
ically accomplish "the encouragement and development of an air transportation
system properly adapted to the ... needs of ... the United States '134 as a
market operating to bring transportation within the reach of consumers who
are today excluded. If the success of the Los Angeles-San Francisco market
were duplicated nationally, the result would be a transportation system unique
in the world. A nation in which everyone could aspire to a breadth of ex-
perience hitherto reserved for tramps and retired physicians would be a re-
markable place, indeed.
MICHAEL E. LEVIN4t
130. CAvas, op. cit. supra note 42 at 92.
131. 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1958).
132. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1958).
133. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(f) (1958).
134. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1958).
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